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22 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Coordination and Publication of
IM 70-63

1. This memorandum is designed to set the record straight, as best as I can recall it, in the interest of making it clear that subject report was fully coordinated within this Agency with the full knowledge that it was intended to be a formal Agency publication.

2. First, as a matter of routine policy, OER coordinates all reports on Vietnam (with some minor exceptions) with ONE, OCI and SAVA. We also coordinate with the concerned elements of DDP when the subject matter is one in which DDP has a primary interest such as the subject of IM 70-63 and the later reports produced in June and September. In the instant case, IM 70-63 had its birth in the form of work done in November/December 1969 at the request of [redacted] Chief, VNO.

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3. By mid-April 1970, Sam Adams had produced a draft which in the judgment of the OER review channel could be passed around for coordination. At the same time we were under considerable pressure from the NSC Staff to forward to them a copy of our report.

4. The subject matter of Communist subversive capabilities was also brought to the attention of the ONE Board (with representations from OCI, SAVA and DDP) on 23 April 1970 when Sam Adams gave a special briefing based on his research. At that meeting, we had a frank round table discussion on Adams' findings including the reliability of the estimates of the number of agents and the significance of VC subversion programs. At that time, I personally told [redacted] that it was our intention to publish Sam's report and that I wished his people would get together with Sam so that we could

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have DDP coordination for publication. [redacted] indicated that getting full agreement would be difficult but that coordination would certainly be possible.

5. On 28 April 1970, [redacted] at my direction, transmitted copies of the draft to [redacted] in DDP to [redacted] SAVA, Bobby Layton, ONE, and to [redacted], OCI. In view of the pressure from the NSC Staff, the memorandum requesting coordination said that unless there were objections we would send a copy of the memorandum in its present draft form to the NSC Staff. We also set a deadline of Wednesday, 29 April, for the various parties to state their objections. It may have been the language "present draft form" which led some parties to believe that they were coordinating a report that would be sent in draft form for Dr. Kissinger's use but would not be published. This interpretation hardly seems warranted. Paragraph 3 of the memorandum requesting coordination read as follows: "Comments and suggestions to be incorporated before publication may be communicated later."

6. I don't recall the exact sequence of events but believe that it must have been the launching of the operations in Cambodia on April 30th which made me decide not to send the draft report to the NSC Staff but to wait until the report had been formally published before it was transmitted. On 4 May I sent the draft to the Publications Staff for final typing and reproduction. By this date, the draft had been coordinated and reflected changes requested by the following individuals:

Bobby Layton, ONE (no changes requested)

[redacted], OCI

[redacted], OCI

[redacted] with [redacted] approval, SAVA (their suggested changes were forwarded by memorandum)

[redacted], CI/[redacted] (coordination given verbally on basis of accommodation of their written comments)

and finally, by

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25X1 [redacted] VNO) (coordinated the report
25X1 [redacted] VNO) verbally)
[redacted] VNO (who later forwarded written
comments)

25X1 7. The record keeping on this process was not
the best. For example, we have no copy of [redacted]
memorandum which arrived in OER after the draft had
gone to the Editorial Staff. Nevertheless, we re-
trieved the draft from the Editorial Staff and went
over [redacted] comments and included as many as we could.

25X1 8. On 19 May, Dr. Kissinger sent to Mr. Helms
a memorandum indicating that he was aware of the work
we were doing on enemy subversive capabilities and
asking for further studies. A response to this request
was transmitted on 25 June over Mr. Helms signature.
The response was prepared by OER with the help of
[redacted] SAVA, and [redacted] from DDP. The
25X1 response included parts of EM 70-63, some of the work
we were doing on military proselyting and an input
from the station. The transmittal memorandum from
Carver to the Director included a statement on the
preparation of the response and the fact that it was
a coordinated statement by DDI, DDP and SAVA. I note
here that DDP's coordination did express some reserva-
tions about the estimates of enemy agents but concluded
that because these numbers were properly caveated that
they could coordinate in the report.

9. The coordination process for ER IM 70-134
fortunately was much better documented. We have in
the record the formal statement of coordination from
the Acting Chief, DDP/FE. The importance of the
coordination of the IM 70-134 is that it contained
many of the same numbers and judgments which were pre-
sented in IM 70-63. In fact the latter IM referenced
the earlier one and pointed out that it was a more
detailed study of one of the three VC military sub-
versive organizations discussed in IM 70-63.

[redacted]
Deputy Director
Economic Research

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